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Conceptualizing the Three Asías
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have compelled 
International Relations scholars to search for new patterns of order in an unfamiliar 
world The emergence of a contiguous group of five new states m Central Asia has m 
effect created a new geopolitical region with wider implications for the existing regions 
around it In refocusing our conceptual lenses, how useful is it to think in terms of Three 
Asías—Central West and South—as an integrated analytical framework7 In this paper, I 
argue that although the relationships among the three regions are not well developed, 
the concept of Three Asías is a useful analytical device that throws light on emerging 
patterns of international politics m a turbulent and unpredictable region
Arguments against the Concept
On the face of it there are good reasons for eschewing such a reordering of geopolitical 
space First the states of Central Asia may be conceived of as simply a subordinate or 
satellite system of Russia Not only is this a matter of historical continuity, it is arguably 
a recognition of contemporary reality Although Russia is at present relatively weak, it 
is the one country which not only has an abiding strategic interest in controlling Central 
Asia but has the capacity to do so From this standpoint it is not particularly useful to 
think of Central Asia as a politically significant region Second though there are bound 
to be strategic interactions between the Central Asian states and states m neighboring 
regions, these may be regarded as relatively inconsequential because the latter are 
preoccupied with their own mtra-regional concerns and lack the capacity to influence 
Central Asia in any meaningful way Turkey s interests are to a considerable degree tied 
up with Europe Iran is primarily a Middle Eastern power, India and Pakistan are tied 
into a hostile relationship that leaves them with limited ability to influence 
developments in Central Asia Thus, it might be more helpful to think of the three 
regions as security complexes that are largely independent of each other
Third, economic mteractions among the three regions are limited each region—indeed 
each individual country—is oriented to markets and sources of investment and 
technology in the advanced capitalist world (and Russia, in the case of Central Asia) 
Fourth it may be held that, notwithstanding a veneer of cultural homogeneity endowed 
by their allegiance to Islam, the states of Central, West and South Asia are ethnically so 
diverse in their sectarian, linguistic and tribal identities that it is not particularly 
illuminating to think of them as culturally uniform Finally, while environmental 
deterioration m Central Asia does affect neighbormg lands, it is not yet clear that it does 
so m a way that makes it particularly useful to think of the Three Asías holistically
That having been said, there are a number of reasons why the concept of Three Asías 
can be a profitable frame of reference To begin with, the concept, like others such as 
region or system , is an analytical construct an abstraction from reality that serves 
to throw light on a particular area of interest The primary criterion for choosing to
1
focus on a particular set of relationships is whether it is interesting or not 1 In other 
words, does the concept illume relationships that m some way determine the fate of 
interlinked units of action7 Further, the question then arises for whom is it interesting 
and in what way7 Before elaborating on this, I will first show that, despite arguments to 
the contrary there are several significant existmg and potential relationships among 
the Three Asías
Linkages among the Three Asías
From the standpoint of strategic politics the Three Asms have a long history The 
meteoric rise of Mongol power in the thirteenth century brought all three regions into 
one security complex From the sixteenth century, the rise of the Turkish, Persian, 
Uzbek and Mughal empires created an intricate balance-of-power game among the 
great powers of the Three Asías British colonial policy m South Asia was deeply 
concerned with events m the other two regions notably Napoleon Bonaparte s invasion 
of Egypt and Tsarist Russia s consolidation of power in Central Asia More recently, the 
Soviet Union s expansion beyond its Central Asian borders into Afghanistan rekmdled 
the Cold War and aroused serious security concerns m West and South Asia Given its 
uncertain political future and the potential ramifications of instability m its environs, 
Central Asia is a region of continumg interest and concern to the other two Asms as well 
as to the United States
The key issue is that of stability and change in Central Asm As All Banuazizi and 
Myron Weiner have observed, the breakup of every empire in the twentieth century has 
been followed by conflicts among its successor states 2 Imperial rule leaves behind 
ethnic tensions arising from migration and divide-and-rule policies, borders that often 
do not coincide with ethnic identity, and weak political institutions inadequately 
equipped for self-governance The resultant internal quarrels tend to become 
internationalized because the weaker parties seek assistance from across the border 
Apart from the legacy of imperialism, developing countries are invariably under 
pressure from their citizens nsmg expectations, which tend to outpace both growth and 
distribution The mtensely competitive politics that ensues more often than not assumes 
an ethnic character with transnational ramifications Societies under stress may also be 
drawn toward religious fundamentalism, which too tends to spill across state and 
regional borders There is abundant scope in Central Asm for developments of this sort
So far, one Central Asian state has experienced serious civil strife Since 1992, the war 
between Tajikistan s government and a combination of Islamic and other opposition
1 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood-Cliffs,NJ Prentice-Hall, 
1965), p 30
2 All Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, Introduction in All Banuazizi and Myron 
Weiner, ed s , The New Geopolitics o f Central Asia and Its Borderlanda (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis,IN Indiana University Press, 1994), pp 1-5
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groups has claimed several thousand lives and displaced close to a million people 
Similar conflicts could well occur elsewhere in Central Asia for the political and 
economic reasons mentioned abo\ e and because of the composition of the population m 
the region Ethnic sensitivities are strong in Kazakstan, where the Kazaks constitute 
only 39 per cent of the population, Russians 38 per cent and others the rest Over 20 per 
cent of all Tajiks m Central Asia live m Uzbekistan and 7 per cent of all Uzbeks m 
Tajikistan There is also a significant Uzbek minority m Kyrgyzstan and a history of 
tension between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan Cultural lmkages--and potential sources 
of conflict-extend beyond into Turkey Iran and Afghanistan, all of which have strong 
historical connections with Central Asia The strains of economic development could 
cause one or more of these potential conflicts to erupt mto inter state conflict, as is the 
case with the civil war m Tajikistan, which has involved Russia, Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan This in turn could spread beyond Central Asia mto West and South Asia
As regards the role of religion m the Three Asías it is not necessary to view Islam as a 
monolith in order to appreciate its potential for lighting a political fuse in the region 
Like language, religion has an atavistic appeal that captures the lmgination of the 
insecure Like language, religion can become the driving force of political mobilization 
and power in societies strivmg to combme economic growth with participatory politics 
While it is highly unlikely that a unifying Islamic wave will surge through the Three 
Asías there is every possibility that specific areas will be engulfed in religious conflict 
As will be seen, the security perceptions and policies of several states are shaped by just 
such a possibility It is true that the conflicts m Central Asia are largely among Muslims, 
but that does not diminish the power of Islam to unify specific groups against others, as 
is evident in Tajikistan The transnational appeal of religion can then extend conflicts 
mto neighboring regions
Central Asia has also become the hub of narcotics production It is estimated that 
300,000 acres of land are devoted to the cultivation of opium poppy, making this region 
(along with Myanmar) the world s largest source of opium, and 10 million acres to 
hemp which is used to make hashish and marijuana 3 Organized crime has established 
an extensive network for the production, refinement and distribution of drugs that 
encompasses Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India Pakistan s Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto has accused the drug syndicates of funding Muslim fundamentalist 
groups m her country The traffic m narcotics is also closely lmked to large-scale illegal 
trading in weapons There is considerable scope for the growth of the drug-arms- 
terrorist nexus in the region, and the consequent jeopardization of national security m 
the Three Asías (though at present West Asia has been less affected) So long as the 
region remains unstable because of weak political institutions, uncertain economic 
growth and ethnic conflict, organized crime and terrorism will sustain a security 
complex from the perspective of the states of the Three Asías
3 Nancy Lubin Central Asia Isseus and Challenges for US Policy m Banuazizi and 
Werner eds , The New Geopolitics o f Central Asia, pp 264-5
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Afghanistan plays a pivotal role in the region 4 Located at the hub of the Three Asms, it 
is Central Asia s gateway to the other two Asías for trade and the piped transfer of oil 
and gas There are currently some 3 million Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan 
Militant Afghan groups have been active m these countries as well as in Tajikistan and 
Kashmir Their activities range across the entire spectrum from political terrorism to 
trafficking in narcotics A stable Afghanistan would enhance the security of its 
neighbours, an unstable one could aggravate the difficulties they already face For 
instance the disintegration of Afghanistan would very likely draw its Pushtuns mto a 
movement to unite with their ethnic counterparts m Pakistan Though there has been 
some diminution in the intensity of its factional conflicts it seems likely that 
Afghanistan will contmue to be a focal point for the security interests of the Three Asías 
m the near future
Finally it is worth speculating what might result from sudden changes m mternational 
politics of the kind that have periodically surprised the world m recent decades One 
possibility is that Russia unable to cope with its attempts to develop liberal-capitalist 
political and economic institutions might lapse mto an ultra-nationalist dictatorship 
seeking to recover its lost empire A Russian move mto Central Asia would then be on 
the cards, arousing acute fears and consequent policy responses m West and South Asia 
as well as among the US and its allies Another possibility is the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons capability by Iran, which would drastically alter the politics not only of the 
Middle East, but also deeply affect the security of Central and South Asia Arguably 
nothing of the kind may happen but the possibilities are not far-fetched and 
policymakers have an interest in possibilities that might affect their interests 
significantly Ultimately, what make the conception of Three Asms a meaningful one is 
precisely the interests of those within and outside the region who regard the 
connections drawn above as mteresting
The Three Asías as an "Interesting" Concept
Central Asian states themselves have an interest in the linkages between the Three 
Asms Above all there is a strong awareness among them that they are uncomfortably 
close to their former imperial center and hence vulnerable to post-imperial center- 
periphery relations or, worse, reabsorption mto a revived Russian empire As a result, 
they have been keen to develop ties with the developed countries, which are also the 
primary source of much-needed investment and technology However the response has 
been limited, partly because investors have other more lucrative avenues to enter into, 
and partly because of an inclination among the US and its allies not to provoke Russian 
nationalism Central Asian states are therefore drawn more strongly toward their 
neighbors in South and West Asm Thus they have quickly joined larger regional 
organizations such as the Black Sea Consortium (with Turkey, Russia and others), the
4 Thomas Barfield, The Afghan Morass Current History, vol 95 no 597 (January 
1996) p 43
4
Caspian Sea group (with Iran and Russia), and the Economic Cooperation Oganization 
(with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) They have also joined the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) and developed close diplomatic ties with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and 
to some extent India None of these organizations and countries has the capacity to 
displace Russia as the primary player m Central Asian politics but the fact remains that 
West and South Asia are important m the games that Central Asian states play
Consequently there is also an abiding Russian interest m the Three Asms Initially 
there was a major divide between the Atlanticists, led by President Boris Yeltsm and 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and the Eurasiamsts whose major spokesmen 
were State Consellor Sergei Stankevich, Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi and 
Parliamentary Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov 5 The Atlanticsts preference for a West- 
oriented foreign policy was shaken by the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan in mid- 
1992 in which rebel forces received aid from Iran and Afghanistan Driven by a 
common fear of Muslim fundamentalism, Russia and the Central Asian governments 
forged a common front A Treaty on Collective Security was signed between Russia, 
Tajikistan Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia, and Russian troops 
entered Tajikistan in support of the Communist government Separate bilateral treaties 
were signed with all five of the Central Asian states between June 1992 and June 1993 
At the time of writing (the summer of 1996) the civil war contmues and Russian troops 
remain in Tajikistan Russia retains a long term interest in subduing ethnic conflict m 
Central Asia not only because of the presence of a large number of Russians there but 
because it fears the repercussions on its own linguistic and religious minorities To the 
extent that Central Asian ethnic conflicts are provoked and aided by groups and states 
in West and South Asia it will have a larger interest in the Three Asms Given the 
instabilities in the region and its proclivity toward ethnic conflict this mterest is likely 
to remain strong for some time to come Whether Russia will intervene so extensively as 
to arouse regional and American fears of a southward expansion drive is a moot point 
The probability of that may depend on the nature of the Russian government (how 
democratic it remains) and on the level of instability m Central Asm 6
American m terest in Central Asia and its environs encom passes nuclear 
nonproliferation, the containment of Islamic fundamentalism the checking of Iranian 
power, and investment 7 The initial concern with respect to Central Asm was that 
Kazakstan might, along with Ukraine and Belarus, become a nuclear weapon state
5 Amin Saikal, Russia and Central Asia/ in Amin Saikal and William Maley, eds , 
Russia in Search o f Its Future (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1995)
6 Rajan Menon, Central Asm s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges, NBR Analysis 
voi 6, no 4 (December 1995)
7 Abdul Shakoor, Central Asm The US Interest-perception and Its Security Policies, 
Eurasian Studies, voi 2 no 2 (Summer 1995), pp 14-24
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Even if it did not, it had the potential to become a source of nuclear technology and 
materials for covert proliférants These worries have largely ended with Kazakstan s 
accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (April 1994) and its signing of a 
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (July 1994) 8 
Islamic fundamentalism and its potential to sweep across the Three Asías remains a 
serious concern because it could damage American interests m West Asia US policy, 
therefore has sought to encourage secular Turkey s involvement in Central Asia as well 
as to stabilize Pakistan s somewhat unsteady constitutional democracy in order to 
reduce the likelihood of a fundamentalist surge linking the Three Asms The 
containment of Iran is a complementary objective American policy toward Russia in 
this respect is caught on the horns of a dilemma On the one hand, Russia plays an 
important role m curbing fundamentalist forces in Central Asia, on the other, it is 
carving out a sphere of influence that could well lead to the renewal of the Russian 
threat to West Asia 9
China, too has an integrated view of the Three Asms shaped by the politics of 
ethnicity 10 A large proportion of the population in its Xinjiang province is composed of 
Turkic Muslim peoples who have strong affinities with ethnic groups across the border 
m Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan Sections of these became restive during the period 1989- 
91, evoking fears of a fundamentalist threat to Chinese control of the provmce Chma s 
leaders have also been wary of Turkey s ambitions in the area and the potential danger 
that a pan-Turkic movement might pose Their response to the perceived threat has 
been to mcrease their influence m the Central Asian states by means of rapidly growing 
trade Relations with Iran have also been mamtamed at a high level, both because it is a 
lucrative market and in order to restrain its radical potential in Central Asia In 
pursuing its policy of curbing the ethnic threat, China even seems to have reviewed its 
relationship with Pakistan in October 1994, it proposed the creation of a bilateral trade
8 There remain some residual problems with regard to nuclear materials which are 
being attended to For a recent evaluation, see Nuclear Successor States o f the Soviet Union, 
Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report No 4 (Monterey,CA Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, Washington,DC and Moscow Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace May 1996)
9 The dilemma is made more acute by a desire not to rock the delicate boat of Russia's 
mfant democracy, and by the limits to what the United States can do to influence 
Russian actions m Central Asia See Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia s New States 
Independence Foreign Policy and RegionalSecunty (Washington DC United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp 177-9
10 Ross H Munro, Central Asia and China, m Michael Mandelbaum, ed , Central Asia 
and the World (New York Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994)
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bloc with India as a counter to regional trade groupings H Although nothing came of 
it because of the lack of a response from New Delhi, the proposal is significant because 
it called for cooperation m high-technology defense-related areas which would have 
adversely affected China-Pakistan relations, and because it is illustrative of China s 
integral view of the Three Asías
For Turkey, the emergence of Central Asia has opened up the possibility of a less West- 
oriented identity The end of the Cold War has reduced its significance to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and diminished the likelihood of its entry into the 
European Community (EC) Turkish interest in Central Asia, prompted by cultural 
affinity and a need to broaden its choices, has been supported by the United States, 
which would like the Central Asian states to gravitate toward secular Turkey The 
sudden enlargement in the number of Turkic states has evoked a new aspiration for 
leadership that harks back to the heady imperial days of the Ottoman Empire 
However, Turkey's role m Central Asia is limited by a number of factors 12 its economy 
is troubled by high inflation and unemployment, which limit its capacity to invest in 
Central Asia Despite talk of a Turkish Commonwealth, it is no position to 
overshadow Russia s influence m the region, or for that matter Iran s Beyond a point 
pan-Turkism could also provoke a strong reaction form Turkey s already restive 
Kurdish minority 13 Ultimately, it is doubtful if Turkey can reorient itself away from 
Europe, on which its economic prospects will depend in the foreseeable future In spite 
of its promotion of ECO Turkey is the one significant player m Central Asia that neither 
has nor is likely to have a Three-Asías perspective
Iran on the other hand, does have such a perspective It has a close cultural affinity 
with Tajikistan, whose population is largely Persian-speaking Because of its relative 
economic isolation it also has a strong economic interest m Central Asia as a whole and 
has been quick to offer the landlocked states of the region an overland route to the Gulf 
by means of a rail link between Meshad in northern Iran and Ashkhabad in 
Turkmenistan The widespread fear of Iran s proclivity for fostering radical Islamic 
movements is exaggerated Iran is primarily a Shia country while Central Asia s 
Muslims (mcludmg those of Tajikistan) are mamly Sunnis In any case ethnic unrest in 
Central Asia goes agamst Iranian economic and political interests Besides jeopardizing 
economic relations with Central Asian leaderships already wary of Iranian radicalism, it
11 The reference was to the revitalization of ECO See Stephan Blank, Central Asia, 
South Asia and Asian Security, Eurasian Studies voi 2 no 3 (Fall 1995) p 17
12 Rubab Hasan Turkey and Central Asia, m Mooms Ahmar, ed Contemporary 
Central Asia (Karachi Department of International Relations, m collaboration with 
Hanns-Seidel Foundation, Germany 1995)
13 Graham E Fuller, The New Geopolitical Order, m Banuazizi and Weiner ed s, The 
New Geopolitics o f Central Asia and Its Borderlands, pp 34-5
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Asias'-and particularly Central Asia's-potential for political instability, the politics of 
the region will remain an integrated politics.
For the analyst,the Three Asias concept is useful in three ways. First, it throws light on 
the foreign policies of the concerned countries' response to a changed geopolitical 
landscape. Second, it enhances our knowledge of the ways in which geopolitical change 
affects the behavior patterns of states, for instance the ways in which they reformulate 
self-images (Turkey) or extend competition to new arenas (India-Pakistan). Finally, the 
new pattern of interstate politics also emphasises a more fundamental continuity in 
state behavior. Notwithstanding periodic claims that political realism is passe, it is clear 
that the stuff of international politics is still power and national interest and all the 
strategic and tactical games that go with them.
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